Hong Kong : US President Donald Trump is scheduled to arrive in China on November 18, 2026, for an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Whilst in China, Trump is expected to attend a three-way meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and host President Xi Jinping.
During the summit in Shenzhen, southern China, there is much for the American and Chinese leaders to discuss, including a trade war, microchips, nuclear non-proliferation and security. Yet multiple recent events, such as the Iran war, the shocking defeat of Trump's Republican Party in the midterm elections, and the spectacular fall of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, may have put the US in a position of relative weakness vis-à-vis China.
Of course, it is quite likely that nothing substantive will emerge from bilateral and trilateral talks. This is partly because, for China, visual optics and symbolism matter most. Xi will be delighted that the US is treating China as an equal when it comes to discussing global affairs. Beijing certainly believes its growing strategic power has earned it the right to sit at the table with the US and for Washington, DC, to treat it with due respect.
In many ways, Trump has little option. After a crippling midterm election defeat, Trump must take any wins he can, and one of those is foreign diplomacy. Therefore, meeting with world leaders at APEC, including host China, is vital for an emasculated Trump. In fact, Trumpism has accelerated great-power competition towards a de facto G2 structure that balances China against the US.
Discussing the US midterm elections, Ryan Hass, Director of the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center, commented, “The US midterm election outcome wasn’t about China, but there’s a lesson in it for the forthcoming China policy debate in 2028. When the US public isn’t brought in or bought into major foreign policy actions, it will not tolerate being told to bear costs for them.”
Hass pointed out that Trump, as he promised whilst electioneering, neither reduced costs nor avoided war. Instead, he pursued both with his tariff and Iran war agendas, all without consulting the public. Hass thus warned, “Trump’s midterm reckoning offers a cautionary tale for future leaders. If strategy is disconnected from the priorities of the American people and indifferent to the costs they’re willing to bear, it’ll struggle to survive contact with voters.
This doesn’t mean the US should take a passive or cost-avoidant posture towards China, but it does mean future US leaders will need to understand Americans’ priorities and concerns on China and be straight with them about the trade-offs of their strategy to gain public support.”
Hass concluded, “To be durable, China strategy will need to reflect the priorities of the American people. If strategy appears disconnected from US public preferences and lacks public support, it’ll struggle to attract buy-in from allies and partners, and will invite challenges from Beijing.”
China has already been exploiting the weakness of US governance and the vested interests of big business. With companies seeing only dollar signs when viewing the Chinese market, few are willing to toe the line when it comes to US national security interests. This is evident in the behaviour of Huang of Nvidia.
Miles Yu, principal China policy and planning adviser to former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and now Director of the China Center at the Hudson Institute, argued that Huang had for years promoted a false narrative about China and artificial intelligence (AI). These premises include the assertions that China is winning the AI race; export controls do not work; selling chips to China protects US leadership; restricting Chinese researchers is unpatriotic; Nvidia’s profits are in America's interests; and being a China hawk is a “badge of shame”.
Yu commented, “Why do Chinese AI developers, including those behind Kimi and Alibaba’s models, constantly exploit American AI systems such as Claude and OpenAI’s models? Beijing’s hunger for American technology exposes the weakness in Huang’s alarmism.” Yu said restricting Chinese access to advanced chips cripples China's momentum, and that such delays are a strategic victory.
Yu warned that, in reality, “Nvidia wants market share. Beijing wants military and technological supremacy. Why should America supply the tools that could help the People's Liberation Army challenge American forces and enhance the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) surveillance empire?”
The fact is that private companies, among them Tesla and Nvidia, are beholden to profit-making rather than national security. Huang had thus lobbied for expanded Chinese access to advanced American technology. Revelations concerning Huang’s extramarital relationship with Alice Huang indicate that hundreds of thousands of advanced chips made their way into Chinese hands through the latter’s Singapore-based Megaspeed.
Certainly, the balance of power between China and the US has changed. Indeed, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s readout of Xi’s mid-September 2026 state visit to Washington, DC, underlined a new framework for China-US relations, which Beijing refers to as a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”.
In a 16 October 2026 article published by Fu Xiaoqiang, President of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, which is affiliated with the Ministry of State Security), he argued that the new relationship sets boundaries for competition, supports China’s core interests and promotes future cooperation.
Regarding this article, J. Michael Dahm and M. Reece Breaux, writing for the Jamestown Foundation think tank in the US, remarked, “The October 2026 article likely serves three overlapping purposes ahead of Xi and Trump’s November and December meetings. Externally, it communicates Beijing’s conception of a sustainable PRC-US relationship to Washington. Domestically, it explains to Chinese policymakers how to operationalise the new great-power relationship. Strategically, it presents the PRC and the United States as equals, making future US accommodation of PRC interests both necessary and achievable.”
Wang emphasised three principles upon which this “constructive relationship of strategic stability” is based. The first is respect, which entails “honouring each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the social systems and development paths chosen by each side, and each other’s core interests and major concerns”. This is what the CCP craves: for others to accept its Orwellian authority and monstrous abuse of human rights, for example.